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PREFACE 

Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century 
The global regime for nuclear nonproliferation has been under duress since nuclear weapons were first 
developed and used in World War II, as seen by the efforts of many nations to acquire nuclear weapons. The two-
tiered Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commits the five nuclear-weapon parties (the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council: US, UK, Russia, China and France – the P5) not to assist any state in acquiring nuclear 
weapons, while non-nuclear-weapon parties commit not to acquire nuclear weapons and to implement IAEA 
safeguards to prevent “diversion of nuclear energy for peaceful uses to nuclear weapons….” India, Pakistan, Israel 
and North Korea are not NPT parties. This requires dealing in parallel with the capabilities of these four non-NPT
states, the P5 states and the 185 non-nuclear NPT parties. 
If Iran were to build the bomb, in violation of its NPT obligations, how will NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, 
such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, react? If the US, China, or Russia, were to resume nuclear testing, would this lead 
to testing by others, and to new deployments of nuclear weapons? The NPT regime extends beyond the treaty in 
numerous ways to help counter those and other risks. Tools, such as diplomacy between nations, arms control, 
economic sanctions, safeguards and protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), physical security 
for nuclear materials and weapons, counter-proliferation military strikes, port and border security, limits on 
production of weapons-useable uranium and plutonium, export controls on sensitive nuclear technology, regional 
security, missile defense, and the Proliferation Security Initiative – a global effort to stop trafficking in weapons of 
mass destruction – are all part of the broader region. That interconnected system must be resilient to unpredictable 
changes. Further nuclear testing or withdrawal of a nation from the NPT would pose serious challenges to the 
regime. 
Figure 1 and the book cover seek to illustrate in a compact way the history of the spread of nuclear weapons 
since the first nuclear test in 1945. “Horizontal proliferation” refers to additional states obtaining nuclear weapons, 
while “vertical proliferation” refers to nuclear-weapon-possessing states obtaining more nuclear weapons.  This 
figure shows that the eight states that have tested a nuclear weapon have proceeded, since their first test, in a similar 
fashion. The reductions in the stockpiles of the US and USSR-Russia are clear; similarly UK and French weapon 
numbers have declined. For the others the picture is either uncertain, or the numbers are increasing, although at 
much lower levels than the US and Russian numbers. 
FIGURE 1. Best available information on numbers of nuclear weapons from 1945 to 2012. The logarithm of the 
number of stockpiled weapons is plotted from left to right, keyed to the date of first nuclear test: US (2013 totals; 4650 
stockpile, 2120 operational), Russia (4300 stockpile, 1600 operational), UK (225), France (300), China (250), India 
(90-110), Pakistan (100-120) and N. Korea (5-10). [Pierce Corden, adapted from data of Hans Kristensen]
Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century 
AIP Conf. Proc. 1596, 1-4 (2014); doi: 10.1063/1.4876452 
© 2014 AIP Publishing LLC 978-0-7354-1230-9/$30.00 
1 This article is copyrighted as indicated in the article. Reuse of AIP content is subject to the terms at: http://scitation.aip.org/termsconditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
Many now believe that a nuclear weapons confrontation is more likely to happen, but at a lower level of 
confrontational intensity. We don’t know if this is true, but there is some evidence for this conclusion. The global 
nuclear nonproliferation regime is challenged today, as it has been over the past several decades: It has had to deal 
with events in India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria.  Since the American 
Physical Society’s Forum on Physics and Society had not offered a short course on nuclear weapons since 1988, it 
seemed clear that we should examine issues they pose once again. This 4th short course followed the following three
previous conferences on nuclear weapons offered by the Forum on Physics and Society: 
Short Course on the ARMS RACE, San Francisco Hilton Hotel (El Corale, San Luis Obispo, 1982, 179 p.) 
Physics, Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race, Baltimore Convention Center (AIPCP 104, 1983, 372p.) 
Nuclear Arms Race Technologies in the 1990s, George Washington University (AIPCP 178, 1988, 476 p.) 
     The 4th short course was held on November 2 to 3, 2013 at the Elliott School of International Affairs of The 
George Washington University in Washington, DC. It was cosponsored by GWU’s Elliot School and the American 
Physical Society’s Forum on Physics and Society. It was organized by Pierce Corden (American Association for the 
Advancement of Science), David Hafemeister (emeritus, California Poly University) and Peter Zimmerman 
(emeritus, Kings College London). The November 2013 event covered nuclear weapon issues in five sessions. The 
power point presentations can be downloaded from the GWU Elliott School at http://elliott.gwu.edu/nuclear-
weapon-issues-21st-century. The April 2014 issue of Physics Today contains an article on some of the issues 
discussed.1 The short course examined many of the following issues: this volume adds a number of supplementary 
articles. 
Strategic Weapons and Arms Control: Present US policy, an historical discussion on nuclear issues, monitoring 
START treaties, monitoring nuclear warheads and materials, modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, future nuclear 
weapon policies, Gorbachev’s arms-control advisors, adventures in nuclear diplomacy, environmental consequences 
of nuclear war, working towards a world without nuclear weapons, and a primer on nuclear exchange models. 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Fundamentals of the CTBT, the 2012 report of the National Academy 
of Sciences, seismic monitoring, radioxenon and radionuclide monitoring, CTBT on-site inspections, stockpile 
stewardship. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is inter-connected with the global ban on nuclear testing on technical 
and global governance grounds.1 
Ballistic Missile Defense: National Academy of Sciences study on theater defenses against incoming ballistic 
missiles, reducing some of the BMD programs, testing the performance of BMD systems, a history of the Soviet 
view of the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
Nuclear Proliferation: The evolution of the non-proliferation regime, the nuclear programs in North Korean, Iran, 
India and Pakistan, monitoring centrifuges and the blend down of high enriched uranium, laser and centrifuge 
enrichment systems, monitoring a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear forensics. 
Mass-Casualty Terrorism, Review and the Future: Science and technology for homeland security, bio-weapons, 
terrorism and nuclear detection, scanning of vehicles for nuclear materials, workshop review and the future. 
Iran and P5-plus-1 Nuclear Agreement 
Three weeks after this conference, the Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5 and Germany (P5-plus-1) 
became public. The Iranian situation was discussed in the presentations of David Albright, (Institute for Science in 
International Security) Olli Heinonen (former director of IAEA Safeguards, Harvard)  and Larry Satkowiak (Oak 
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Ridge National Laboratroy). See Figure 2 for Iran’s centrifuge capacity at Natanz as of November 2013. The Joint 
Plan of Action went into effect on 20 January 2014. It is hoped that the results of the six-month agreement will lead 
to a more permanent improved situation. 
FIGURE 2.  The number of IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz, Iran. The inoperable centrifuges during 2009 and 2010 were 
disabled by cyber events. Natanz has a total of 18,000 centrifuges and Fordow has 2,700. The pause in late 2013 may 
be related to the negotiations between Iran and the P5-plus-1. [Figure from David Albright] 
The Joint Plan of Action places constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, while lowering economic sanctions on 
Iran by $7 billion over 6 months, which is reversible if it fails. The actions listed below are being monitored by the 
IAEA.2 It doubles the initial breakout time of 1 to 2 months to obtain sufficient HEU for one nuclear weapon.  It is 
hoped that a final agreement can increase the breakout time. This can be done with a ban on possession of 20%
enriched uranium with a limit of 6000 IR-1 centrifuges (6 months) or a limit of 3000 IR-1 centrifuges (12 months). 
1. Halt uranium enrichment above 5%, preventing near-20% HEU production; 
2. Neutralize near-20% enriched HEU stock of 190 kg by oxidation or dilution; 
3. Halt installation of additional centrifuges at Natanz, Fordow and elsewhere;
4. Cap production of 3.5% enriched LEU by non-operation of 12 cascades; 
5. Freeze advances at Arak heavy water reactor, with monthly inspections; 
6. Daily inspections at Natanz and Fordow with managed access; 
7. Access to centrifuge assembly and production facilities; 
8. Earlier notification and information about new nuclear facilities; and 
9. Access to uranium mines and mills. 
The participants of the short course on nuclear weapons issues appreciate the kind and gracious hospitality 
shown by the GWU Elliott School of International Affairs. We are particularly thankful for the help of Associate 
Dean Doug Shaw and Christina Walrond. 
Pierce Corden David Hafemeister        Peter Zimmerman
AAAS, Washington, DC Cal Poly Univ., San Luis Ob, CA        Kings College, London 

&Department of State, Background briefing on implementation Plan of P5+1 and Iran’s First Step Nuclear Agreement, 13 
January 2014, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/21957/htm, www.whitehouse.gov, www.isis-online.org. 
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Left to Right: Pierce Corden (co-organizer), Jonathan Katz (Vehicle Scanning), David Hafemeister (co-organizer), 

Milton Hoenig, and some of the 144 attendees. 

Left to right: Paul Richards (CTBT Seismology) and Frank von Hippel (Fissile Material Cut-off Monitoring) 
Left to right: Ambassador Thomas Graham (Arms Control Negotiator) and Ted Bowyer (Radio-xenon Monitoring) 
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